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FREE THE NIPPLE–FORT COLLINS AND 
THE ENDURING FIGHT FOR GENDER 
EQUALITY 
Abstract: On February 15, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit in Free the Nipple–Fort Collins v. City of Fort Collins held that a 
public nudity ordinance that banned the exposure of female breasts violated the 
Equal Protection Clause. In doing so, the court split from the Fourth, Seventh, 
and Eighth Circuits and established that ordinances that restrict women, but not 
men, from being topless in public are unconstitutional. This Comment argues that 
the Tenth Circuit was correct in holding that the prohibition on public exposure 
of female breasts violated the Equal Protection Clause, as the ban did not sub-
stantially serve any important governmental interest. It further argues that fe-
male-only toplessness bans should be wholly struck down because they are based 
on archaic stereotypes about women’s bodies and have significant adverse effects 
on women. 
INTRODUCTION 
Public female toplessness is at the center of a growing gender equality 
movement in the United States.1 Since the 1990s, advocacy groups have 
brought legal actions to challenge public nudity ordinances that criminalize 
only female toplessness.2 These challenges found minimal success until Febru-
ary 2019, when the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decid-
ed Free the Nipple–Fort Collins v. City of Fort Collins (Free the Nipple II).3 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Deborah Acosta, Free the Nipple?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.
com/video/fashion/100000004162595/free-the-nipple.html [https://perma.cc/Z22Z-DZYN] (explain-
ing the growing popularity of the Free the Nipple movement and its mission to fight for gender equali-
ty). 
 2 See, e.g., People v. Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d 232, 233–34 (N.Y. 1992) (holding that a statute cre-
ated to discourage restaurants from having topless female waiters could not be used to prohibit female 
toplessness in public because the state failed to demonstrate how the law served any important gov-
ernment interest). The defendant in Santorelli, a member of a group known as the “Topfree Seven,” 
was arrested while conducting a demonstration in a public park and bearing her uncovered breasts. See 
id. at 233; Luke A. Boso, A (Trans)Gender-Inclusive Equal Protection Analysis of Public Female 
Toplessness, 18 LAW & SEXUALITY: REV. LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER LEGAL ISSUES 
143, 158–61 (2009) (explaining the history of the movement to take down female-only toplessness 
bans through protest). 
 3 See Free the Nipple–Fort Collins v. City of Fort Collins (Free the Nipple II), 916 F.3d 792, 805 
(10th Cir. 2019) (striking down the city’s public nudity statute that permitted men to be topless in 
public, but not women); Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d at 234 (dismissing charges against defendants for 
allegedly violating a state law banning public exposure of female breasts); see also U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 1; Tagami v. City of Chicago, 875 F.3d 375, 379–80 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that an 
ordinance prohibiting women from being topless in public survived constitutional scrutiny because its 
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The Tenth Circuit evaluated the constitutionality of an ordinance that banned 
female-only toplessness in public.4 It considered whether the ordinance sub-
stantially served the purported interests asserted by Fort Collins, which includ-
ed maintaining public order and protecting children from public nudity, as well 
as whether the alleged physical differences between male and female breasts 
warranted this ordinance.5 Ultimately, the court found that the ordinance vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause.6 
This Comment argues that the Tenth Circuit was correct in holding that a 
public nudity ordinance restricting female-only toplessness could not survive 
intermediate scrutiny, rendering it unconstitutional under the Equal Protection 
Clause.7 Part I of this Comment gives an overview of Supreme Court jurispru-
dence on laws that distinguish on the basis of gender, the history of the Free 
the Nipple movement, and the factual and procedural history of Free the Nip-
ple II. 8 Part II examines and discusses the circuit split and the different posi-
tions courts have taken in analyzing the constitutionality of female-only top-
lessness ordinances.9 Lastly, Part III argues that the Tenth Circuit was correct 
in holding that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause and discuss-
es the implications of female-only toplessness bans and the rationale for elimi-
nating laws of this type.10 
I. EQUAL PROTECTION, GENDER- BASED CLASSIFICATIONS, 
AND FEMALE TOPLESSNESS 
Section A of this Part discusses the Equal Protection Clause and the Su-
preme Court’s development of intermediate scrutiny as the standard of review 
for gender-based classifications.11 Section B discusses the history and impact 
of the Free the Nipple movement in the United States.12 Section C provides the 
purpose was preserving norms and maintaining order); Ways v. City of Lincoln, 331 F.3d 596, 600 
(8th Cir. 2003) (upholding a female-only toplessness ban because the defendant town’s interests in 
preventing the negative effects of public nudity were important and the ordinance was “substantially 
related to these objectives”); United States v. Biocic, 928 F.2d 112, 115–16 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding 
that a public nudity ordinance banning female toplessness was constitutional because the ordinance 
substantially served the government’s interest in “protecting the moral sensibilities”).  
4 Free the Nipple II, 916 F.3d at 800–804. 
5 Id. at 804–05. 
6 Id. (concluding the “overbroad” ban on female toplessness violated the Equal Protection 
Clause). 
7 See infra notes 54–77 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 14–39 and accompanying text.
 9 See infra notes 40–53 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 54–77 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 14–23 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 24–30 and accompanying text. 
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procedural history and facts of Free the Nipple–Fort Collins v. City of Fort 
Collins.13 
A. Equal Protection and Intermediate Scrutiny 
for Gender-Based Classifications 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution requires states to treat all persons “similarly situated” 
equally under the law.14 The Supreme Court has expanded this principle by 
allowing differential treatment for groups of individuals so long as the treat-
ment can survive judicial review.15 Laws that differentiate between men and 
women are subject to a heightened standard of review, known as intermediate 
scrutiny.16 To survive this standard, a law must “serve important governmental 
13 See infra notes 31–39 and accompanying text. 
 14 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 
439–41 (1985) (holding that the existence of “immutable” traits does not justify laws that treat indi-
viduals differently absent some rational relation to a governmental objective); see also Reed v. Reed, 
404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971) (concluding that the statute at issue violated the Equal Protection Clause by 
arbitrarily treating men and women differently who were “similarly situated”). 
15 See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439–40 (holding that courts should presume that legislation 
that draws a classification among persons is valid as long as the classification is “rationally related to 
a legitimate state interest”); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948) (holding that the Constitu-
tion allows for differential treatment as long the distinction drawn by a statute is not irrational). The 
Supreme Court first articulated the deferential “rational basis” standard of review and applied it to 
most state action that created a classification among persons. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 
U.S. 528, 533–34 (1973) (holding that a statutory classification must “rationally further” a legitimate 
state interest to be constitutional); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (concluding that 
laws that create distinctions are constitutional as long as the state’s action is “rationally based” and 
does not arbitrarily discriminate against any group); see also GEORGE BLUM ET AL., 16B AM. JUR. 2D 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 859 (2d ed. 2019) (explaining that courts review most laws containing clas-
sifications for constitutionality using a rational basis standard of review).  
 16 See Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1700–01 (2017) (explaining that all laws 
that distinguish between men and women are subject to heightened scrutiny); United States v. Virgin-
ia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (holding that courts shall review sex-based classifications under a stand-
ard of intermediate scrutiny); City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (holding that classifications based 
upon gender are subject to a more stringent standard of review). See generally Jillian Friedmann, 
Note, A Girl’s Right to Bare Arms: An Equal Protection Analysis of Public-School Dress Codes, 60 
B.C. L. REV. 2547, 2567 (2019) (explaining that policies that intentionally affect one gender more 
than the other are generally unconstitutional). The Supreme Court initially applied rational basis re-
view to sex-based distinctions. See Goesaert, 335 U.S. at 466–67 (upholding a law banning women 
from owning bars because it did not irrationally discriminate against women). After concluding that 
rational basis review was inappropriate for sex and gender-based classifications, however, the Su-
preme Court held that these classifications warranted strict judicial scrutiny. See Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1972) (holding that sex-based classifications are “inherently suspect” and 
courts must review them with “strict judicial scrutiny”). The Supreme Court finally reached the con-
sensus that a middle tier of scrutiny was appropriate for gender classifications and held that intermedi-
ate scrutiny is required for these distinctions. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532–33 (estab-
lishing the standard for evaluating gender-based classifications); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 
190, 197 (1976) (holding that sex-based classifications are subject to a heightened scrutiny under the 
Equal Protection Clause).  
2020]  Public Exposure of Female Breasts & the Equal Protection Clause II.-433 
objectives and must be substantially related to achieving these objectives.”17 
Physical differences between males and females may occasionally justify dif-
ferential treatment under the law, but laws based upon generalizations about 
each gender cannot pass constitutional muster.18 States must assert a genuine 
interest served by distinguishing between males and females beyond archaic 
and baseless stereotypes about women or their physical characteristics.19 The 
classification must actually further this interest, and the state cannot simply 
declare the interest in response to a legal challenge to the classification.20 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197–99 (holding that laws that distinguish between men and women 
must be substantially related to “important governmental objectives” to pass intermediate scrutiny); 
see also Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725–26 (1982) (holding that there must be a 
“direct, substantial relationship between objective and means” in order for a state’s gender classifica-
tion to pass constitutional scrutiny). The Court has recognized that protecting public safety and health 
are legitimate government interests, but it has also emphasized that state actions must actually accom-
plish these objectives to satisfy intermediate scrutiny. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 199–200. The Supreme 
Court made it clear that “discrimination that ‘is merely the accidental byproduct of a traditional way 
of thinking about females’ is unacceptable.” Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 442 (1998) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (quoting Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 (1977)). 
 18 See Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1700–01 (2017) (explaining that laws based on generaliza-
tions about gender roles and capabilities will be more closely scrutinized); Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS., 
533 U.S. 53, 68 (2001) (upholding a law that made it easier for an undocumented immigrant to gain 
citizenship if he entered the country with his mother, rather than his father, because the classification 
was based on the physical difference in the relationships between newborn children and their mothers 
compared to those with their fathers); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (holding that, alt-
hough some laws may differentiate based upon physical differences between men and women, they 
must not be premised on gendered generalizations); Michael M. v. Sup. Ct. of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 
464, 470–71 (1981) (concluding that a California law that defined statutory rape as unlawful sexual 
intercourse with a female was not unconstitutional because the sex classification was based on physi-
cal differences between males and females and the interest in preventing unwanted pregnancy). The 
Supreme Court has held that classifications based upon “inherent differences” between males and 
females, though potentially constitutional, may not be used to further the notion that women are infe-
rior. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533–34.  
 19 See Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 725 (explaining that courts must ensure that statutes’ 
purposes are not to perpetuate “archaic and stereotypic notions”); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 
at 533 (holding that the justification for a sex-based classification must be genuine); Weinberger v. 
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638, 642–43 (1975) (holding that a provision of the Social Security Act 
that differentiated, on the basis of sex, the amount of earnings a surviving family member could col-
lect was unconstitutional because it was based on the stereotype that men financially supported their 
families more than women). The Court acknowledged that “societal understandings” change over 
time, and therefore laws that were constitutional at their enactment may devolve into constitutional 
violations if the interests they once served are no longer legitimate. See Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 
at 1684 (holding that a federal immigration law was unconstitutional because it was based on an out-
dated stereotype about the roles and capabilities of husbands and wives, though these stereotypes 
permissibly existed in many laws and judicial opinions when the law was created); Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015) (explaining that courts may invalidate current laws that are 
based on inequitable principles that were once permissible). 
 20 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (“The justification must be genuine, not hypothe-
sized or invented post hoc in response to litigation.”); Craig, 429 U.S. at 199–200 (concluding that the 
state’s different minimum age for purchasing liquor for males and females did not closely serve its 
asserted interest in protecting public safety and therefore the legislation was unconstitutional). In order 
for a sex-based distinction to survive intermediate scrutiny, the interest asserted by the state must be 
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The Supreme Court requires an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for 
laws that discriminate based upon gender, and the government bears the bur-
den of proving this justification.21 Though the Supreme Court has never ad-
dressed the constitutionality of statutes prohibiting female-only toplessness, 
several federal courts of appeals have heard Equal Protection challenges 
against this type of ordinance.22 These lower courts consistently rejected the 
argument that female-only toplessness bans violate the Equal Protection 
Clause, and instead have held that these restrictive laws are substantially relat-
ed to the important government interests of protecting public morality and 
safety.23 
                                                                                                                           
the actual rationale behind enacting the legislation. See Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1684–85 (ob-
serving that the state’s asserted interests in ensuring a connection between child and citizen parent and 
preventing statelessness were likely not the true reason for the sex-based classification at issue); see 
also Craig, 429 U.S. at 201–04 (holding that the state did not present sufficient evidence to prove that 
its purpose in enacting the sex-based classification was reducing traffic accidents); Weinberger, 420 
U.S. at 648 (explaining that the state may not simply offer an interest to support its action if that inter-
est was not the actual motivation behind the action). The Supreme Court explained that courts review-
ing sex-based classifications must find that there is a sufficient means-ends connection between the 
legislation and the asserted interest to ensure the classification is genuine and not motivated by an 
intent to discriminate or disadvantage any group. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (ex-
plaining that courts must guarantee that the purpose of a classification is not to disadvantage the group 
subject to different treatment); see also Michael M, 450 U.S. at 470 (quoting Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 
648 n.16) (affirming that a court may reject a state’s asserted interest “if ‘it could not have been a goal 
of the legislation’”). 
 21 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 524 (explaining that in order for a court to uphold a 
law that classifies based on gender, a party must show an “‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for 
the classification”); see also Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 724 (holding that the state was re-
quired to provide an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for a law that prohibited men from taking 
university courses for credit) (citing id.). An “exceedingly persuasive justification” exists if the dis-
tinction between males and females is “substantially related to the achievement of important govern-
ment interests.” United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 524. The Court has recognized that the protec-
tion of public health and safety, along with “public sensibilities” and morality are important interests 
that may justify discriminatory ordinances so long as the classification “closely serves” to accomplish 
these goals. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 199–200 (holding that “public health and safety” are significant 
interests of state and local governments). 
 22 See, e.g., Free the Nipple II, 916 F.3d at 795 (involving a challenge to a city ordinance banning 
females over age ten from exposing their breasts in public); Tagami, 875 F.3d at 377 (involving the 
member of a topless advocacy group challenging the constitutionality of a Chicago ordinance restrict-
ing female-only toplessness in public); Ways, 331 F.3d at 599 (involving a challenge to a city ordi-
nance banning females from exposing their breasts without fully opaque coverings); Biocic, 928 F.2d 
at 113 (resolving a challenge to a United States Fish and Wildlife regulation prohibiting female top-
lessness in wildlife refuges). In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, the Supreme Court held that a public nudity 
ordinance prohibiting completely nude dancing did not violate the First Amendment, but did not reach 
the question of whether the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause. 501 U.S. 560, 565 (1991). 
 23 See Tagami, 875 F.3d at 380 (affirming that an ordinance prohibiting women from being top-
less in public survived constitutional scrutiny because it protected norms and public order); Ways, 331 
F.3d at 600 (upholding a public nudity ordinance prohibiting the exposure of female breasts intended 
to protect the public from nudity); Biocic, 928 F.2d at 115–16 (concluding that a public nudity ordi-
nance banning female toplessness was constitutional because the ordinance was substantially related 
to the important government interest of preserving “moral sensibilities”). 
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B. The “Free the Nipple” Movement 
The “Free the Nipple” movement began its fight for gender equality in 
2012.24 The idea behind the movement is simple: men and women should be 
equal, and this certainly includes the right to be topless in public.25 To achieve 
this goal, members of the movement engage in public protests and bring litiga-
tion against cities with discriminatory public nudity ordinances.26 In recent 
years, the Free the Nipple campaign has spread significantly on social media 
sites, where it has amassed an impressive global following.27 The movement 
drew inspiration from the Topfree Seven, a collection of women responsible in 
                                                                                                                           
 24 Lina Esco, “Free the Nipple” Is Not About Seeing Breasts, TIME (Sept. 11, 2015), https://time.
com/4029632/lina-esco-should-we-freethenipple/ [https://perma.cc/H2L7-6T49]; Sophie Roberts, The 
Breast Exception: What Is Free the Nipple, What Celebrities Are Involved, Is It Illegal to Go Naked in 
Public, and What Counts as Graphic Content on Facebook?, THE SUN (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.
thesun.co.uk/fabulous/2778411/free-the-nipple-campaign-celebrity-supporters-laws-illegal-facebook-
instagram/ [https://perma.cc/R4ST-CF4P]. A film entitled “Free the Nipple” was released in 2012 and 
brought attention to the growing social movement. Roberts, supra. The film featured the movement’s 
founder, Lina Esco, and highlighted efforts taken by members to raise awareness on gender inequality 
and discriminatory public nudity ordinances. Id. The current movement may trace its pre-history back 
to a group of outspoken women in the 1990s in New York. See Helen Pundurs, Public Exposure of the 
Female Breast: Obscene and Immoral or Free and Equal?, 14 IN PUB. INT. 1, 1–2 (1994–1995) (dis-
cussing prior social demonstrations conducted by the plaintiff in Santorelli and their effect of 
strengthening the growing gender equality movement). As one member, Miley Cyrus, explained: “It’s 
not about getting your titties out. It’s about equality.” Gregory Babcock, A Beginner’s Guide to the 
“Free the Nipple” Movement, COMPLEX (Jan. 23, 2015), https://www.complex.com/life/2015/01/
guide-to-the-free-the-nipple-movement/ [https://perma.cc/2NY9-GX37].  
 25 See Ashley Terrill, Meet the Women Behind the #FreeTheNipple Movement, ELLE (Jun. 23, 
2014), https://www.elle.com/culture/career-politics/news/a15444/meet-the-women-behind-freethenipple-
movement/ [https://perma.cc/Z3K2-M7J6] (featuring the Free the Nipple founder explaining that 
legalizing female toplessness is one of the first battles to win in the enduring fight for gender equali-
ty). Thirty-five states have laws banning female toplessness, but none have laws regulating male top-
lessness. Id. 
 26 See Free the Nipple–City of Fort Collins v. City of Fort Collins (Free the Nipple I), 237 F. Supp. 
3d 1126, 1128 (2017) (explaining that the plaintiffs in this case initially protested Fort Collins’ public 
nudity ordinance by exposing their breasts on a street corner); Boso, supra note 2, at 147 (explaining the 
history of the movement to take down female-only toplessness bans through protest). In addition to 
fighting to allow women to be topless in public, Free the Nipple also seeks to rid society of the outdated 
notion that female breasts are inherently sexual. See Babcock, supra note 24 (featuring explanation by 
Free the Nipple founders that female toplessness will become less politically charged once members of 
society, especially men, are able to view female breasts as not inherently sexual objects). Members, in-
cluding many celebrities, have taken to social media sites to protest discriminatory nudity policies that 
allow men to post photos of their nipples but not females. See id. (listing celebrities who have shared 
posts referencing the movement, such as Miley Cyrus and Cara Delevingne).  
 27 See Babcock, supra note 24. The movement gained significant momentum on Twitter and 
Instagram due to its popular hashtag, #FreeTheNipple, and has over 450,000 combined followers on 
these sites. Free the Nipple (@freethenipple), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/freethenipple?lang=en 
[https://perma.cc/2NAQ-LVAN]; Free the Nipple (@freethenipple), INSTAGRAM, https://www.insta-
gram.com/freethenipple/ [https://perma.cc/Y8AD-V9UK]. A number of celebrities have participated 
in the movement by posting photos to social media with “#freethenipple” included in the caption. 
Roberts, supra note 24. 
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part for the legalization of female toplessness in New York State.28 Since then, 
a growing number of city legislatures have followed suit and repealed public 
nudity ordinances, partially because of zealous advocacy by Free the Nipple 
members.29 The most successful and noteworthy legal action Free the Nipple 
commenced is the case discussed in this Comment: Free the Nipple–Fort Col-
lins v. City of Fort Collins.30 
C. History of Free the Nipple–Fort Collins v. City of Fort Collins 
In 2017, Free the Nipple–Fort Collins, Brittany Hoagland, and Samantha 
Six filed an action in the United States District Court for the District of Colo-
rado against the City of Fort Collins.31 The plaintiffs challenged the constitu-
tionality of the defendant’s public nudity ordinance, which prohibited women 
from revealing their breasts in public, arguing that the ordinance was a viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.32 In decid-
                                                                                                                           
 28 See Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d at 234 (overturning the ban on female-only toplessness and ordering 
dismissal of the charges against the defendant); Babcock, supra note 24 (discussing the efforts taken 
by the defendant in Santorelli during her fight to free the nipple). The defendant in People v. Santorel-
li, who was arrested for violating the city’s ban on exposure of female breasts, was a member of the 
Topfree Seven. 600 N.E.2d at 233; see Boso, supra note 2, at 147 (explaining that Ramona Santorelli 
was arrested during a public demonstration for exposing her breasts). Santorelli challenged her arrest 
in court and the court ultimately decided the discriminatory ordinance could not stand. Santorelli, 600 
N.E.2d at 234. 
 29 See Sarah Begley, Here’s Where It’s Legal for Women to Go Topless in the U.S., TIME (Apr. 
24, 2015) (showing a map of states that allow both men and women to be topless in public). Free the 
Nipple has also impacted the everyday lives of women by leading to an increase in female empower-
ment and even a newfound trend of displaying nipples in fashion. See The Impact of the Free the Nip-
ple Movement, VELVET’S EDGE BLOG (May 13, 2019), https://velvetsedge.com/lifestyle/the-impact-
the-of-the-free-the-nipple-movement/ [https://perma.cc/MG3F-YC69] (discussing fashion trends fea-
turing nipples and the recent popularity of nipple augmentations). 
 30 See Free the Nipple II, 916 F.3d at 807 (holding a public nudity ordinance forbidding female 
toplessness violated the Equal Protection Clause). There has recently been significant media coverage 
about the case and increasing legality of female toplessness, which has sparked a revived interest in 
the Free the Nipple movement. See, e.g., Ben Feurherd, Free the Nipple: Going Topless Effectively 
Legalized in Six States, N.Y. POST (Sept. 19, 2019), https://nypost.com/2019/09/19/free-the-nipple-
going-topless-effectively-legalized-in-six-states/ [https://perma.cc/7HD7-LSC2] (explaining the con-
sequences of the Tenth Circuit’s decision); Dillon Thompson, “Free the Nipple” Movement: Women 
Can Now Legally Go Topless in 6 States, AOL (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.aol.com/article/news/
2019/09/20/free-the-nipple-movement-women-legally-topless-fort-collins-colorado-oklahoma-utah/
23817022/ [https://perma.cc/K37J-5RLR] (reporting the impact of the Tenth Circuit’s decision on 
women and the evolving conversation about female toplessness); Pete Williams, Topless Women Win 
Big as Colorado City Drops Ban, NBC NEWS (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/
politics-news/topless-women-win-big-colorado-city-drops-ban-n1056701 [https://perma.cc/HWN9-
YAAK] (reporting on the Free the Nipple victory in Colorado and its implications for the Tenth Cir-
cuit). 
 31 Free the Nipple–Fort Collins v. City of Fort Collins (Free the Nipple I), 237 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 
1135 (D. Colo. 2017). 
 32 Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Fort Collins, CO. MUN. CODE § 17-142 (2017). The 
city’s ordinance prohibited females over the age of ten from showing their breasts in public. Id.; Free 
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ing whether to grant the plaintiffs’ motion, the district court considered four 
main factors: whether the plaintiffs would likely succeed on their Equal Pro-
tection claim, whether the ordinance would cause the plaintiffs irreversible 
harm, the balance of injustices that would result from granting or denying the 
injunction, and the public interest.33 The court ultimately found that the plain-
tiffs demonstrated credibility that they would succeed on their Equal Protection 
challenge and enjoined the defendant from enacting the revised ordinance.34 
The City of Fort Collins appealed to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit, which ultimately affirmed the district court’s decision in 
February of 2019.35 The court focused its inquiry on whether the defendant’s 
ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause by creating an unconstitutional 
                                                                                                                           
the Nipple I, 237 F. Supp. 3d at 1129. Violators of this ordinance could be subject to a fine, impris-
onment, or both. § 17-142; Free the Nipple I, 237 F. Supp. 3d at 1129. Two years prior to filing the 
lawsuit, the plaintiffs, among other women, held a protest in opposition to Fort Collins’ restrictive 
ordinance and revealed their breasts with only opaque coverings over their nipples. Free the Nipple I, 
237 F. Supp. 3d at 1128–29. The plaintiffs and other protestors argued that they were complying with 
the ordinance because they had solid-colored coverings over their nipples. Id. The plaintiffs intended 
to express their view that the ordinance was the result of “tired stereotypes” and the “hyper-
sexualization of women’s breasts.” Id. In response, the Fort Collins City Council enacted a modified 
ordinance, which again prohibited females over the age of ten from appearing in public topless. § 17-
142(b). This revised ordinance was substantially similar to the original ordinance, but it contained an 
exception for breastfeeding mothers. Id.; Free the Nipple I, 237 F. Supp. 3d at 1129.  
 33 Free the Nipple I, 237 F. Supp. 3d at 1130–35; see Kikuma v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 955 (10th 
Cir. 2001) (explaining that in order to succeed on a motion for a preliminary injunction, a movant 
must demonstrate “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits (2) irreparable injury will result if the 
injunction is denied, (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs the injury to the other party, 
and (4) the injunction is not adverse to the public interest”). The district court found that the plaintiffs 
would likely succeed in establishing that the defendants unconstitutionally enacted an impermissibly 
gender-based, discriminatory statute. Free the Nipple I, 237 F. Supp. 3d at 1133. In regards to the 
second factor, the court found the plaintiffs would suffer harm caused by a deprivation of their consti-
tutional right to equal protection under the laws if the ordinance was permitted. Id. at 1134. In balanc-
ing the injustices that both sides would experience if the injunction were granted, the court found that 
the plaintiffs would be harmed more by governmental denial of their rights than the city would be 
harmed. Id. Finally, the court found it would be contrary to the public interest to allow the defendants 
to violate the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Id. at 1134–35. 
 34 Free the Nipple I, 237 F. Supp. 3d at 1135. First, the court rejected that the defendant’s asserted 
interest in promoting traffic safety was an important interest, because the defendant failed to offer a 
legitimate explanation as to how topless women could create a risk of accidents. Id. at 1131. Similar-
ly, the court rejected the alleged interest in protecting children from the dangers of public nudity as an 
important government interest. Id. In conducting its inquiry into the legitimacy of the city’s asserted 
interests, the court found no connection between the interests and the means chosen to promote them, 
as there was insufficient evidence to support claims of any adverse effects of female toplessness on 
public safety. Id. at 1131–34. 
 35 Id. at 1126, appeal docketed, No. 17-01103 (10th Cir. March 21, 2017); see Free the Nipple II, 
916 F.3d at 804 (holding that the district court did not err in concluding that the plaintiffs would likely 
succeed on their Equal Protection claim). The defendant contended that its ordinance did not violate 
the Equal Protection Clause and that the court erred in granting the plaintiffs’ motion, because the 
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the ordinance unfairly discriminated against women. Free the 
Nipple II, 916 F.3d at 800. 
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gender-based classification.36 Ultimately, the court concluded that the ban on 
female toplessness did not survive intermediate scrutiny, because it did not 
substantially further any legitimate government interest.37 In reaching this con-
clusion, the court first explained that the defendant’s purported interests in pro-
tecting children and promoting public safety were impermissibly based on ste-
reotypes about female breasts.38 The court also held that the City of Fort Col-
lins failed to demonstrate sufficient evidence that the ordinance substantially 
served these interests.39 
II. THE TENTH CIRCUIT’S SPLIT IN DETERMINING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY 
OF BANS ON PUBLIC FEMALE TOPLESSNESS 
In holding that public nudity ordinances prohibiting female toplessness 
are unconstitutional and violate the Equal Protection Clause, the Tenth Circuit 
distinguished itself from several other circuits, which held that these ordinanc-
es survive heightened judicial scrutiny.40 For example, in 2017, in Tagami v. 
City of Chicago, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
held that Chicago’s ordinance allowing only males to show their breasts in 
public did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.41 The court concluded that 
banning the exposure of female breasts substantially served the essential gov-
                                                                                                                           
 36 Free the Nipple II, 916 F.3d at 800. 
 37 Id. at 801–05. The court considered whether the inherent differences between male and female 
breasts gave sufficient grounds for different treatment for males and females and concluded that it did 
not. Id. at 801. The court also concluded that the defendant’s ordinance was premised upon generali-
zations about female nudity, as opposed to legitimate differences between male and female breasts. Id. 
 38 Id. at 803–04 (holding that interests based on stereotypes about women, including protecting 
children from the dangers of female breasts, may not be constitutionally furthered by sex-based classi-
fications). The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the ordinance was meant to prevent chil-
dren from exposure to nudity, as well as the argument that its purpose was to uphold public order and 
prevent traffic accidents caused by distracted drivers, agreeing with the district court that the motiva-
tion behind the ordinance was a “sex-object stereotype” about women’s breasts. Id. 
 39 Id. at 804–05 (holding that the ordinance failed to satisfy the “tight means-ends fit” that is 
required under intermediate scrutiny because it was unconstitutionally overbroad). The court further 
agreed with the district court’s finding that the plaintiffs would suffer harm if the city were to enact the 
ordinance, that the balance of injury weighed toward the plaintiffs, and that the injunction was not against 
the public interest. Id. at 805–07. 
 40 See Free the Nipple–Fort Collins v. City of Fort Collins (Free the Nipple II), 916 F.3d 792, 805 
(10th Cir. 2019); Tagami v. City of Chicago, 875 F.3d 375, 380 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that an ordi-
nance prohibiting the exposure of female breasts in public withstood constitutional review under the 
Equal Protection Clause); Ways v. City of Lincoln, 331 F.3d 596, 600 (8th Cir. 2003) (stating that a 
similar public nudity ordinance survived intermediate scrutiny because the law was “substantially 
related” to the city’s goal of eliminating the negative consequences of public nudity); United States v. 
Biocic, 928 F.2d 112, 116 (4th Cir. 1991) (affirming that the city’s nudity ordinance passed interme-
diate scrutiny because it was substantially related to the city’s interest in preserving “moral sensibili-
ties”). 
 41 See Tagami, 875 F.3d at 377, 380 (affirming the dismissal of a member of the nonprofit organ-
ization, GoTopless, Inc.’s suit against the city of Chicago for its ordinance that restricted female-only 
toplessness after being cited for violating the ordinance). 
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ernmental purpose of protecting “traditional norms and public order.”42 The 
court based its conclusion, in part, on the inherent physical differences be-
tween male and female breasts, noting that only female breasts are considered 
“erogenous” and therefore should not be openly exposed.43 The Eighth Circuit, 
in Ways v. City of Lincoln, affirmed the constitutionality of a similar public 
nudity ordinance banning open exposure of female breasts, because the city’s 
goal was to protect the public from the negative consequences of public nudity, 
and the ordinance substantially served this public interest.44 In United States v. 
Biocic, the Fourth Circuit held that a comparable public nudity ordinance sur-
vived intermediate scrutiny because it substantially served the defendant’s im-
portant interest of “protecting moral sensibilities.”45 
                                                                                                                           
 42 See id. at 379 (concluding that protecting “norms and public order” were important government 
interests because members of the public should not unwillingly encounter nudity in public). Beyond 
acknowledging the defendant city’s alleged interest in protecting the public from inadvertent exposure 
to nudity, the court did not explain how the ordinance protects traditional morality, opting instead to 
declare the interest “self-evident.” See id. at 379 (concluding that the interest of promoting traditional 
norms survived intermediate scrutiny). 
 43 Id.at 380. 
 44 See Ways, 331 F.3d at 598–600 (providing the factual background of the case involving the 
owner of a gentlemen’s club suing the City of Lincoln for its allegedly overbroad and unconstitutional 
public nudity ordinance). The plaintiff was arrested and convicted of violating the ordinance because 
he operated a gentlemen’s club with partially nude female dancers and, in turn, sued the city, seeking 
a declaration that the ordinance was unconstitutional. Id. at 596–98. On May 6, 2019, approximately 
two months after the Tenth Circuit decided Free the Nipple II, the Eighth Circuit affirmed that a city 
ordinance banning female-only toplessness was constitutional because the ordinance was substantially 
related to preventing the negative effects of public nudity and maintaining public order. Free the Nipple–
Springfield Residents Promoting Equality v. City of Springfield, 923 F.3d 508, 510–12 (8th Cir. 2019) 
(holding that the ordinance was constitutional because it did not rely on obsolete stereotypes about 
gender norms and was substantially related to “promoting public decency and proscribing public nudi-
ty to protect morals, public order, health, and safety”). This case was decided after Free the Nipple II, 
so this Comment does not discuss it further, though it is worth noting that the case could increase the 
likelihood that more appellate courts will uphold ordinances banning female-only toplessness as con-
stitutional. See id. at 510–12 (upholding a statute prohibiting female toplessness); Free the Nipple II, 
916 F.3d at 803 (striking down a ban on female toplessness as a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause).  
 45 See Biocic, 928 F.2d at 113, 115–16 (evaluating the defendant’s claim that a federal public 
nudity ordinance, which she was convicted of violating, was unconstitutionally vague and in violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause). The court, like in Tagami, went further to explain that many view 
female breasts as erogenous, but that the same is not true for male breasts. Id. at 115–16; see Tagami, 
875 F.3d at 379. The Second Circuit, in Buzzetti v. City of New York, affirmed that exposure of female 
breasts may have adverse consequences when it upheld a zoning ordinance that restricted adult-
entertainment businesses from operating in certain parts of the city. See 140 F.3d 134, 141–42 (2d Cir. 
1998) (holding that the city may restrict areas where adult entertainers conduct business because of 
their adverse effects, which include lower property values and higher crime rates). Though Buzzetti is 
part of the federal circuit split, this Comment does not further discuss it because the facts are distin-
guishable and the Second Circuit did not address public health, safety, or morals in its decision. Com-
pare id. at 144 (holding the restrictive zoning ordinance did not violate the Equal Protection Clause 
because it was substantially related to the important interest of limiting the harmful effects of adult 
entertainment), with Free the Nipple II, 916 F.3d at 803–05 (affirming that the defendant failed to put 
forth any important government interest that could be served by the public nudity ordinance). 
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The common thread between the Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits’ 
decisions is the notion that banning public exposure of female breasts substan-
tially serves the government’s significant interest in protecting public morality, 
sensibilities, and norms.46 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the female-only top-
lessness ban without requiring that the defendant present evidence of how the 
ban prevented harmful effects of public nudity, and instead relied on general 
societal disapproval as a sufficient justification.47 The Fourth Circuit conclud-
ed that because female breasts are typically perceived as “erogenous zones,” 
laws forbidding their exposure substantially serve the important interest of pre-
serving moral sensibilities.48 The Tenth Circuit, on the other hand, explicitly 
rejected the deferential rationale of these circuits, and instead concluded that 
the defendant had failed to demonstrate evidence of any harmful effects of fe-
male breast exposure that the public would need to be protected from.49 In re-
jecting this argument, the Tenth Circuit determined that the motivations behind 
the nudity ordinance were actually stereotypes about female breasts and their 
fabricated “danger” to the public.50 
The existence of the inherent physical differences between male and female 
breasts, and their effect on the constitutionality of public nudity laws, is another 
source of contention among the circuits.51 The Fourth and Seventh Circuits 
shared the rationale that male and female breasts are fundamentally different 
                                                                                                                           
 46 See Tagami, 875 F.3d at 379 (holding that the public nudity ordinance protected “traditional 
moral norms and public order”); Ways, 331 F.3d at 600 (reasoning that the ordinance was intended to 
eliminate the negative consequences of public nudity and promote public health and safety); Biocic, 
928 F.2d at 115 (holding that the government could enact the ordinance at issue to protect members of 
society who do not want to see female breasts in public). 
 47 See Tagami, 875 F.3d at 379 (concluding that the prohibition on female toplessness could stand 
because of the historical criminalization of public nudity and general societal disapproval). The Eighth 
Circuit adopted an even more deferential approach and simply concluded that the important govern-
ment interest of shielding the public from the negative effects of nudity was substantially served by 
the ordinance, without any further discussion. Ways, 331 F.3d at 600. The court relied heavily on 
precedential cases involving public nudity ordinances in reaching its decision. See id. at 598–99 (ex-
plaining Eighth Circuit cases upholding public nudity ordinances substantially similar to the statute at 
issue in Ways). 
 48 Biocic, 928 F.2d at 115–16. 
 49 Free the Nipple II, 916 F.3d at 803. The Tenth Circuit adopted the reasoning of the district 
court, which found that there was no evidence that alleged adverse effects—including endangerment 
of children, distracted driving, and harm to public order—would result from females exposing their 
breasts in public. Id.; see Free the Nipple I, 237 F. Supp. 3d at 1131 (rejecting the defendant’s argu-
ment that female breasts threaten traffic safety by distracting drivers). In turn, the court concluded that 
the defendants failed to satisfy the means-ends fit test required to survive heightened scrutiny. Free 
the Nipple II, 916 F.3d at 805. 
 50 Free the Nipple II, 916 F.3d at 803–04. 
 51 Compare id. at 801 (holding that there is no meaningful difference between male and female 
breasts as to warrant differential treatment by nudity ordinances), with Tagami, 875 F.3d at 379–80 
(explaining that, because of physical differences, female breasts are “intimate body part[s],” whereas 
male breasts are not), and Biocic, 928 F.2d at 115 (acknowledging the physical differences between 
male and female breasts referenced in the public nudity ordinance). 
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because society only recognizes female breasts as sexual and erogenous.52 The 
Tenth Circuit, in contrast, acknowledged the physical differences between men 
and women, namely the ability to breastfeed, however, it concluded that the jus-
tification for the defendant’s ordinance did not lie with these dissimilarities.53 
III. THE TENTH CIRCUIT IS CORRECT THAT PUBLIC NUDITY ORDINANCES 
THAT PROHIBIT EXPOSURE OF FEMALE-ONLY BREASTS  
CANNOT SATISFY INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY 
The Tenth Circuit correctly held in Free the Nipple–Fort Collins v. City of 
Fort Collins that a public nudity ordinance banning only the exposure of fe-
male breasts violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Consti-
tution.54 Though the Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have determined that 
this type of ordinance is constitutional, foundational cases from the Supreme 
Court provide ample support for the Tenth Circuit’s holding.55 
As the Supreme Court has required for all laws distinguishing between 
males and females, there must be an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for 
public nudity laws banning the exposure of only female breasts.56 The Fourth, 
                                                                                                                           
 52 See Tagami, 875 F.3d at 380 (explaining that the fact that female breasts are “intimate” body 
parts and different from male breasts justifies the nudity ordinance’s distinction); Biocic, 928 F.2d at 
115–16 (explaining that the physical differences between male and female breasts serve as a constitu-
tional justification for the female-only public toplessness ban). 
 53 See Free the Nipple II, 916 F.3d at 801–02 (recognizing that physical differences may warrant 
differential treatment under the law, but not if the rationale for the treatment is actually rooted in ste-
reotypes and generalizations). The court concluded that the physical differences between breasts did 
not warrant singling out female breasts for different treatment because the Equal Protection Clause 
requires more. See id. at 805 (explaining that Equal Protection jurisprudence reveals the need for more 
physical differences to warrant different treatment). 
 54 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Free the Nipple–Fort Collins v. City of Fort Collins (Free 
the Nipple II), 916 F.3d 792, 805–06 (10th Cir. 2019). 
 55 See Tagami v. City of Chicago, 875 F.3d 375, 379 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that the public nudi-
ty ordinance banning only female toplessness was constitutional); Ways v. City of Lincoln, 331 F.3d 
596, 600 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that the public nudity ordinance was constitutional because it in-
tended to eliminate negative consequences of public nudity and promote public health and safety); 
United States v. Biocic, 928 F.2d 112, 115 (4th Cir. 1991) (upholding the constitutionality of a public 
nudity ordinance prohibiting female-only toplessness); see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 
515, 534 (1996) (holding that the state failed to present an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for 
refusing to admit females to the Virginia Military Institute and, therefore, violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199–200 (1976) (holding that a law allowing women to 
buy higher proof alcohol at a lower age violated the Equal Protection Clause because it did not sub-
stantially serve the important government interest of promoting traffic safety); Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 411 U.S. 677, 690–91 (1973) (holding that distinguishing between genders in the administration 
process for military service benefits for spouses solely for “administrative efficiency” was unconstitu-
tional); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971) (explaining that, although distinguishing between 
males and females for the administrator application process produced efficiency in probate courts, it 
violated the Equal Protection Clause by arbitrarily discriminating against women). 
 56 See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982) (holding that the government 
bears the burden of presenting an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for its creation of a classifica-
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Seventh, and Eighth Circuits concluded that the alleged dangerous adverse 
consequences that flowed from females exposing their breasts in public war-
ranted restrictive public nudity ordinances to maintain public morals, sensibili-
ties, order, and safety, but they did so without going into detail as to what those 
dangers are.57 Though these are important government interests, banning fe-
male toplessness does not further them in any way.58 Intermediate scrutiny 
commands a substantial connection between the asserted interest and means 
chosen to further that interest, yet the Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits ap-
pear to be satisfied by a hypothetical rational relationship between the two.59 
                                                                                                                           
tion-based statute); see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 524 (concluding that the state must 
provide an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for drawing a distinction between men and women 
in law). 
 57 See Tagami, 875 F.3d at 379–80 (holding that the ordinance was substantially related to the 
government interest in shielding the public from the harmful effects of seeing female breasts); Ways, 
331 F.3d at 600 (upholding the district court’s finding that a female toplessness ban was substantially 
related to protecting the public’s well-being); Biocic, 928 F.2d at 116 (recognizing that the ordinance 
served the important government interest of “protecting the moral sensibilities”). The closest that 
these courts came to explaining an adverse effect of seeing female breasts is simply concluding that 
unwillingly seeing female breasts is an adverse effect. See Tagami, 875 F.3d at 379 (recognizing that 
the defendant city had an important interest in protecting the public from unwanted exposure); Biocic, 
928 F.2d at 115–16 (concluding that the public nudity ordinance was permissible because it protected 
the public from unwillingly encountering female breasts). 
 58 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (holding that different military academies for 
male and female students did not substantially serve the state’s purported interest in providing a dis-
tinct educational experience for male students); Craig, 429 U.S. at 199–200 (concluding that protect-
ing public safety and health are legitimate government interests); Free the Nipple II, 916 F.3d at 804 
(concluding that the public nudity law was overbroad and did not substantially further the city’s inter-
est in promoting public order and preventing traffic accidents). 
 59 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 536 (holding that the state must articulate a close 
connection between the aim of the sex-based classification and underlying motivation of the legisla-
tion (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 727, 730)); Craig, 429 U.S. at 199–200 (concluding 
that a sex-based classification must closely serve a state’s asserted interests in order to survive judicial 
review); Free the Nipple II, 916 F.3d at 805 (concluding that the defendant city failed to satisfy the 
means-ends fit test required by intermediate scrutiny); Tagami, 875 F.3d at 379 (concluding that the 
ordinance substantially served the interest of protecting members of the public from the harmful ef-
fects of seeing female breasts without requiring evidence of those effects); Ways, 331 F.3d at 600 
(concluding that the government interest in protecting the public from the consequences of public 
nudity was substantially furthered by the ban on female toplessness); Biocic, 928 F.2d at 116 (holding 
that prohibiting females from exposing their breasts substantially serves the important interest of pro-
tecting “moral sensibilities”). The Supreme Court has held that the state has the burden of proving a 
“close resemblance between the ‘alleged objective’ and ‘the actual purpose underlying the discrimina-
tory classification.’” United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 536 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 
U.S. at 727, 730). This means that a state cannot provide an unfounded justification for a gender clas-
sification without demonstrating how the classification actually relates to an important government 
objective. See id. at 535–36 (concluding that the policy rationale for a gender classification must be 
“genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation”). The Supreme Court in 
Lawrence v. Texas explicitly restricted states from relying purely on public “morality” as an important 
government interest to justify classifications in statutes. See 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (explaining that 
states could not criminalize homosexual sodomy solely because it had been historically viewed as 
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The Tenth Circuit correctly applied intermediate scrutiny and rejected the de-
fendant’s claims that the ordinance was designed to protect the public because 
the defendant failed to provide any evidence of how the toplessness ban would 
further any of the asserted interests.60 
The Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits accepted inadequate and unper-
suasive explanations from the governmental defendants when evaluating the 
relationship between restricting the public from seeing female breasts and 
promoting public morals and safety, and thus they failed to appropriately apply 
intermediate scrutiny.61 Unjustified acceptance of female toplessness bans by 
courts perpetuates gender discrimination, which can have severe adverse con-
sequences.62 Forbidding the exposure of female breasts in public also perpetu-
ates the false notion that the primary purpose of female breasts is sexual pleas-
ure.63 The Seventh Circuit had based its holding on the “fact” that physiologi-
                                                                                                                           
“immoral”); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992) (explaining 
that the Court’s “obligation is to define the liberty of all, and not to mandate [its] own moral code”).  
 60 See Free the Nipple II, 916 F.3d at 803–04 (concluding that the public nudity ordinance did not 
substantially further the city’s asserted interests of protecting children and promoting traffic safety 
because it was overbroad and drew an unnecessary distinction); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583 
(O’Connor, J. concurring) (rejecting “moral disapproval” as an important policy interest). The defend-
ant’s ordinance was likely motivated by an illegitimate “public morality” concern based upon outdat-
ed stereotypes about women’s breasts and their unwavering sexuality. See Free the Nipple II, 916 
F.3d at 804–05 (concluding that the city’s concerns about threats to public morality, child endanger-
ment, and traffic accidents stemmed from stereotypes about female breasts being sex objects). The 
court concluded that the City of Fort Collins could not enact its female toplessness ban because it failed 
to satisfy the means-ends fit test required by intermediate scrutiny. See id. at 805. 
 61 See Tagami, 875 F.3d at 379 (holding that a ban on female toplessness substantially furthered 
the government’s asserted interests); Ways, 331 F.3d at 600 (same); Biocic, 928 F.2d at 115 (same). 
The court in Tagami held that the defendant city was justified in its female-only toplessness ban be-
cause female breasts are “intimate, erogenous, and private,” and therefore should be hidden to protect 
the public. Tagami, 875 F.3d at 380. The court failed to explain, however, why female breasts bear 
this description and how banning their exposure actually protects the public. See id. The court in Ways 
simply held that the defendant city had an interest in protecting the public from the harmful effects of 
female toplessness, but did not explain what these harmful effects are. See Ways, 331 F.3d at 600. 
Additionally, the court failed to adequately explain the nexus between prohibiting public nudity and 
the important governmental interest of protecting the public, which would appear to go against the 
Supreme Court’s requirements. See id.; see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 524 (requiring 
an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for sex-based distinctions); People v. Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d 
232, 237 (N.Y. 1992) (Titone, J., concurring) (rejecting the state’s argument that banning female-only 
toplessness substantially furthered important government interests because the state failed to provide 
evidence as to how exposure to a female breast harms members of the public). 
 62 See Tagami, 875 F.3d at 382–83 (Rovner, J., dissenting) (explaining that a potential conse-
quence of these ordinances is that women will be treated unequally at work, in part because they are 
expected to dress differently than men); see also Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d at 236 (Titone, J., concurring) 
(asserting that using “public sensibilities” as a justification may simply be a “reflection of commonly 
held preconceptions and biases” against women). See generally Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1693 
(explaining that laws based on gendered generalizations perpetuate stereotypes about women and their 
domestic roles). 
 63 See Breast Anatomy, HEALTH ENGINE, https://healthengine.com.au/info/breast [https://perma.
cc/G5MR-Y3VH] (explaining that the main purpose of female breasts is breastfeeding). 
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cal differences between male and female breasts cause only female breasts to 
be considered “erogenous,” and therefore protecting the public from unwilling 
exposure is an important government interest.64 In doing so, the Seventh Cir-
cuit blatantly perpetuated the exhausted stereotype that the Tenth Circuit cor-
rectly rejected.65 This is a perfect example of the sort of “overbroad generaliza-
tion” that is forbidden as justification for laws that differentiate based on gen-
der.66 The conversation surrounding female breasts has been changing in recent 
times, as more individuals recognize the lack of meaningful physical differ-
ence between female and male breasts.67 Courts have the unique ability to 
                                                                                                                           
 64 See Tagami, 875 F.3d at 379–80 (holding that the fact that female breasts are deemed ero-
genous is sufficient justification for banning their exposure). 
 65 See Free the Nipple II, 916 F.3d at 804 (holding that the defendant’s ordinance was based on 
stereotypes about female breasts, and that this sex-object stereotype could not stand up to judicial 
scrutiny); Tagami, 875 F.3d at 380. The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning was simply wrong. See Reena N. 
Glazer, Women’s Body Image and the Law, 43 DUKE L. J. 113, 134 (1993) (acknowledging scientific 
evidence that male and female breasts are substantially similar); see also Tagami, 875 F.3d at 382–83 
(Rovner, J., dissenting) (arguing that the plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim should not have been dis-
missed because it was possible that the defendant’s sex-based classification was based on archaic 
stereotypes). 
 66 See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 730 n.16 (explaining that a “statement that relies 
on the very sort of archaic and overbroad generalizations about women that [the Court] has found 
insufficient to justify a gender-based classification” will not withstand constitutional scrutiny); United 
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533–34 (holding that classifications based upon inherent physical dif-
ferences between men and women may not be used to further the notion that women are inferior). The 
dissenting opinion in Tagami argued that the city’s true motive was reinforcing the stereotype that 
female breasts are “objects of desire,” even though the real function of female breasts is to nourish 
children. See Tagami, 875 F.3d at 382 (Rovner, J. dissenting) (rejecting the argument that the city’s 
ordinance could survive intermediate scrutiny). The dissent also argued that courts should not uphold 
discriminatory ordinances simply because they coincide with “traditional moral norms” and percep-
tions. Id. 
 67 See Acosta, supra note 1 (featuring interviews from women in New York exercising their right 
to be topless in public and the general public’s positive reaction to it); Melissa Conrad Stöppler, 
Breast Anatomy, MEDICINENET, (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.medicinenet.com/breast_anatomy/
article.htm [https://perma.cc/Y94F-T8S4] (explaining that male and female breasts are essentially the 
same, except for the fact that male breast tissue lacks the “specialized lobules” that produce milk). 
Female breasts have lobes that contain the glands and ducts involved in milk production. Ströppler, 
supra. This supports the argument that the main difference between male and female breasts is func-
tional, rather than physical. See id. But see Thomas H. Kunz & David J. Hosken, Male Lactation: 
Why, Why Not, and Is It Care?, 24 TRENDS IN ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 80 (2009) (explaining that 
males are technically capable of lactation if exposed to the right combination of hormones). In regards 
to nipples, the purported sworn enemy of public morality, there are essentially no differences between 
male and female nipples, except for, often, size differences. See Michelle Moscova, Why Do Men 
Have Nipples?, PHYS.ORG (Sept. 20, 2019), https://phys.org/news/2019-09-men-nipples.html [https://
perma.cc/9E52-KRZ7] (explaining that the development of male and female nipples is identical until 
female hormones eventually lead to female nipples typically being larger). As previously mentioned, 
the core difference between male and female nipples is a functional one: the evolutionary need to 
produce milk has led to female nipples generally being larger in size, though there are no clear physi-
cal differences apart from that. See id. The Supreme Court has allowed for differential treatment for 
males and females when there are clear physical differences, but has not extended this exception to 
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compel cities to update their outdated public nudity ordinances to reflect this 
shift by rejecting justifications based on gender stereotypes.68 
The logic of the Seventh and Eighth Circuits is further undermined by the 
breastfeeding exceptions in the ordinances at issue, which create a substantial 
possibility that members of the public will still see female breasts.69 The Tenth 
Circuit addressed a similar exception and concluded that it was further evi-
dence that the governmental defendant’s true motive in enacting the ordinance 
was to preserve outdated traditions.70 
The inclusion of the language “female breasts” in public nudity ordinances 
creates confusing and concerning consequences for the approximately 1.4 mil-
lion transgender, nonbinary, and intersex adults living in the United States.71 The 
                                                                                                                           
functional differences. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (acknowledging that physical 
differences between men and women may warrant differential treatment). 
 68 See, e.g., Free the Nipple II, 916 F.3d at 805 (holding that the defendant’s public nudity ordi-
nance violated the Equal Protection Clause). The Tenth Circuit’s creation of a federal circuit split almost 
opened the door for a lower court case challenging a similar ordinance to potentially reach the Supreme 
Court, however, the Supreme Court declined to hear the case. See State v. Lilley, 204 A.3d 198, 208–09 
(N.H. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 858 (2020) (holding that the defendant city’s nudity ordinance 
did not violate the New Hampshire or federal Equal Protection clauses because it substantially served 
the city’s interest in supporting “public health, public safety, morals, and public order”); Ben Feuer-
herd, Right to Bare Boobs: Topless Advocates Take Battle to Supreme Court, N.Y. POST (Aug. 20, 
2019), https://nypost.com/2019/08/20/right-to-bare-boobs-topless-advocates-take-battle-to-supreme-
court/ [https://perma.cc/G5DR-G8AJ] (reporting on the petition to the Supreme Court); U.S. Supreme 
Court Asks New Hampshire to Respond in ‘Free the Nipple’ Case, PRESS HERALD (Sept. 17, 2019), 
https://www.pressherald.com/2019/09/17/u-s-supreme-court-asks-new-hampshire-to-respond-in-free-
the-nipple-case/ [https://perma.cc/Y7W5-4XQ5] (explaining that the United States Supreme Court 
requested New Hampshire to respond to an appeal that the State v. Lilley defendants filed after being 
arrested for violating a public nudity ordinance). The Supreme Court in Lawrence reasoned that it 
should use the country’s developing laws and traditions when analyzing the constitutionality of a law 
that is justified by public morality. 539 U.S. at 571–72. If the Supreme Court ever addresses female-
only toplessness bans, it should follow in the Lawrence Court’s footsteps and look to the modern trend 
of increased individual liberty in public places to determine that these bans are archaic and unconstitu-
tional. See id.; Begley, supra note 29 (showing a map of the states that allow women to expose their 
breasts in public). 
 69 See Tagami, 875 F.3d at 383 (Rovner, J., dissenting) (explaining that Chicago’s ordinance had 
an exception for women breastfeeding in public); Ways, 331 F.3d at 599–600 (providing an excerpt 
from the city’s ordinance that explicitly laid out an exception for breastfeeding women). If the defend-
ants in these cases truly wanted to protect the public from the dangers of seeing breasts in public, they 
would have enacted a complete ban on public exposure, rather than including a substantial exception. 
See Tagami, 875 F.3d at 383 (Rovner, J., dissenting) (calling attention to the breastfeeding exception); 
Ways, 331 F.3d at 599–600 (same). The presence of a significant exception connotes the likelihood of 
there being an ulterior motive in enacting restrictive public nudity ordinances, most likely archaic and 
stereotypical views on female breasts. See generally Free the Nipple II, 916 F.3d at 802–03 (explain-
ing that the breastfeeding exception in the defendant’s ordinance called into question whether their 
actual interest was protecting children). 
 70 See Free the Nipple II, 916 F.3d at 802–03 (explaining that there was still a likelihood that 
children would be exposed to female breasts). 
 71 See Kristin Lam, More Than 7,000 Americans Have Gender X IDs, a Victory for Transgender 
Rights. Is It a Safety Risk, Too?, USA TODAY (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation/2019/08/08/nonbinary-gender-ids-momentum-intersex-state-driver-licenses/1802059001/ [https://
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resulting exemption of individuals whose legally-designated sex is not female, 
due to the limiting language of the term “female,” from public toplessness ordi-
nances further demonstrates the need to update these laws because, transgender 
women may be topless in public so long as their legally-designated sex is male.72 
This apparent loophole provides further evidence that the underlying purpose in 
enacting this type of ordinance is not to protect public safety and morality, but 
rather to discriminate against females and to perpetuate the antiquated stereotype 
that female breasts function primarily for objectification and sex.73 
Though the government defendants in Tagami, Ways, and Biocic may cite 
to protecting the public as justification for ordinances banning the public expo-
sure of female breasts, the more likely motivation is grounded in gender dis-
crimination, overused stereotypes, and the historic hyper-sexualization of fe-
male nipples and breasts.74 There is an inherent risk that courts will allow gov-
ernments to use the “public morality” rationale as justification for discrimina-
tory ordinances, as many have done in the past.75 Gender discrimination, 
                                                                                                                           
perma.cc/75CF-EFEK]. Given that an increasing percentage of the population no longer identifying as 
male or female, this raises questions of how public nudity ordinances restricting only “female” top-
lessness will be enforced, who they are intended to apply to, as well as why they are still so prevalent 
in the first place. See generally Boso, supra note 2, at 161 (explaining the need for courts to take a 
fluid approach on reviewing discriminatory laws because many no longer believe that only “true” men 
and women exist, rather there is overlap between the genders). 
 72 See Boso, supra note 2, at 160–61 (explaining how traditional sex-based classifications affect 
transgender individuals). 
 73 See id.; Virginia Milstead, Forbidding Female Toplessness: Why “Real Difference” Jurispru-
dence Lacks “Support” and What Can Be Done About It, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 273, 280–83 (2004) 
(criticizing how courts have historically treated female-only toplessness bans and discussing the lack 
of essential differences between male and female breasts). 
 74 See Free the Nipple II, 916 F.3d at 804 (explaining the court’s suspicion that the public nudity 
ordinance had less to do with the city’s professed objectives and more to do with the stereotype that 
women are predominantly “sex objects” subject to the male gaze). See generally Sara Sheridan, Top-
lessness—The One Victorian Taboo That Won’t Go Away, BBC NEWS (Nov. 15, 2014), https://www.
bbc.com/news/magazine-30052071 [https://perma.cc/W3QK-F6CC] (explaining that although taboos 
such as women wearing pants or exposing their ankles have lost their force, women’s toplessness in 
public remains a taboo). Female breasts have consistently been labeled “erogenous zones” because of 
the heterosexual male ideology that their primary purpose is for arousal prior to sex. See Nassim Al-
isobhani, Female Toplessness: Gender Equality’s Next Frontier, 8 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 299, 318–19 
(2019) (explaining constitutional challenges to female-only toplessness bans and the false rationales 
given as justifications for these discriminatory public nudity ordinances). This justification appears to 
be the type banned by the Supreme Court, as it is based on a “traditional way of thinking” about fe-
male breasts. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 442 (1998) (quoting Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 
U.S. 199, 223 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)) (holding that sex-based classifications may not rely on 
traditional notions about women for constitutional support).  
 75 See Free the Nipple II, 916 F.3d at 804 (expressing concern that public morality may be used to 
justify sex-based classifications that are actually founded in archaic stereotypes about female breasts, 
even when the government does not explicitly assert it as an important interest); see also Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (holding that a state law criminalizing homosexual sodomy was 
constitutional, because the government had an important interest in protecting traditional norms and 
values and the criminalization of homosexual sodomy substantially served this interest), overruled by 
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which in this case takes the form of female-only toplessness bans, can have 
severe negative consequences for women.76 Women have faced a history of 
stereotyping and discrimination that will endure as long as appellate courts 
continue to uphold laws that arbitrarily distinguish between men and women.77 
CONCLUSION 
In Free the Nipple–Fort Collins, the Tenth Circuit correctly held that a 
public nudity ordinance prohibiting female-only toplessness violated the Equal 
Protection Clause and was thus unconstitutional. The Fourth, Seventh, and 
                                                                                                                           
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558; Biocic, 928 F.2d at 115 (articulating that “protecting moral sensibil-
ities” is the important governmental interest that the ban on female toplessness served). Though Bow-
ers v. Hardwick was explicitly overruled in Lawrence v. Texas, it demonstrates a clear example of the 
Supreme Court allowing the government to use the alleged interest of preserving public morals and 
sensibilities as an excuse to discriminate against a group of individuals and prohibit an activity that 
society allegedly disagrees with. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (holding that Bowers was incorrectly 
decided); Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (upholding a Georgia law criminalizing sodomy because of a wide-
ranging consensus that it was immoral). Reena Glazer has articulated that the concept of “protecting 
public sensibilities” and morality may be nothing more than a reflection of archaic stereotypes about 
female breasts. Glazer, supra note 65, at 128. The “public sensibilities” justification is a slippery slope 
and essentially affords state governments a blank check to discriminate, so long as they can identify a 
traditionally held moral norm that is conceivably protected by the classification. See generally Bow-
ers, 478 U.S. at 196 (upholding a Georgia law criminalizing homosexual sodomy on the grounds that 
the conduct is considered “immoral and unacceptable” by a large population of the state).  
 76 See Georgina M. Hosang & Kamaldeep Bhui, Gender Discrimination, Victimisation, and 
Women’s Mental Health, 213 BRITISH J. PSYCHIATRY 682, 682–84 (2018) (explaining the negative 
effects gender discrimination has on women’s mental health). Although women not being allowed to 
bare their breasts in public may seem like a minor inconvenience, it is still plainly gender discrimina-
tion and signals to women that they are unequal to their male counterparts. See id. at 682 (explaining 
the negative psychological effects of gender discrimination and its tendency to exacerbate psychiatric 
disorders, such as depression). 
 77 See Califano, 430 U.S. at 320 (acknowledging the history of sex discrimination in the United 
States); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684–85 (explaining that the United States has a history of discriminat-
ing against women that was supported by “romantic paternalism” and codified stereotypical distinc-
tions). Though women face less discrimination than they did in the past, they are still subject to subtle 
discrimination in their education and careers. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 685–86 (explaining that 
women have greatly improved their position in society over time, though they still face instances of 
discrimination). The Free the Nipple founders explained that ridding the country of female-only top-
lessness bans is merely one step in the ongoing fight for gender equality. Roberts, supra note 24. To 
truly understand the impact of female-only toplessness bans, one needs to look at the bigger picture of 
gender equality and realize that women will never be truly equal to men if laws like this continue to 
exist. See generally Maria Nardone, The Powerful and Covert Role of Culture in Gender Discrimina-
tion and Inequality, 54 CONTEMP PSYCHOANALYSIS, 747, 751–52 (2018) (explaining that women 
face disadvantages resulting from differential treatment and these disadvantages lead to even more 
inequality). Arguably, women have seldom challenged female-only toplessness bans because the cul-
ture of the United States has conditioned women to believe that these laws are necessary to preserve 
societal traditions and norms. See id. (discussing the impact that culture and ingrained values have on 
the acceptance of gender discrimination). Women who accept discriminatory laws are theoretically 
more likely to accept discriminatory treatment in the workplace and in educational institutions. See id. 
at 754, 757 (explaining that emotions and beliefs stemming from culture contribute to women main-
taining complicity and passivity when being discriminated against). 
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Eighth Circuits have held that nearly identical ordinances were constitutional, 
reasoning that these laws substantially further the governmental interests of 
protecting public safety, morals, and welfare. In holding female toplessness 
bans were constitutional, these circuits were satisfied with a minimal connec-
tion between the asserted interests and governmental means adopted to further 
those interests. The Tenth Circuit correctly rejected the City of Fort Collins’ 
justification for its ban on female toplessness and held that there was insuffi-
cient evidence demonstrating a connection between protecting the public and 
banning females from exposing their breasts. The court concluded that the or-
dinance was likely founded on outdated stereotypes about female breasts being 
primarily sex objects. 
The Tenth Circuit was absolutely correct that laws that restrict only fe-
males from being topless fail to satisfy intermediate scrutiny, as they are prem-
ised on overbroad generalizations and outdated stereotypes about female 
breasts. The Supreme Court should resolve the current circuit split using its 
Equal Protection jurisprudence and affirm that this sort discriminatory classifi-
cation cannot withstand heightened judicial review. Until then, advocacy 
groups like Free the Nipple, in their enduring fight for gender equality, will 
continue to challenge these constricting ordinances based on antiquated and 
wholly unfounded stereotypes surrounding female breasts and their purported 
innate sexuality. 
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